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Rising Inequality and Neighborhood Mixing in US Metro Areas 
 
Abstract: Superstar cities with high-paying creative-class jobs, venture capital, and innovation 
are thought to be more unequal.  We analyze mixing in neighborhoods by income, education, and 
occupation, relating this intraurban measure with regional productivity indicators. Using non-
overlapping census units and a machine-learning estimation technique which iterates over all 
combinations of economic, business, housing, and cultural indicators, we identify “ingredients” 
associated with economically and socially diverse neighborhoods.  Broad support is not found 
that neighborhoods in superstar regions are less mixed; however, overrepresentation in creative 
occupations stymies mixing as does a combination of weak economic fundamentals with high 
shares of new housing. 
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Introduction 
Rising income inequality in the US and globally has captured the attention of 
policymakers and researchers in recent years (Picketty 2014; Stiglitz 2012).  In the US, the Gini 
coefficient measuring nationwide economic inequality rose from 0.403 in 1980 to 0.480 in 2014 
(2014) while nearly all of income growth over the last several decades has gone to the very top – 
usually considered the top 1% - of the income distribution, with stagnant income for the middle-
class.   
Meanwhile, geographers and regional economists have long emphasized the interurban 
dimension of inequality.  Porter (2003) distinguishes a region’s economic activity by its 
involvement in local clusters – industries serving the region’s population – and traded clusters – 
the true engines of contemporary growth involving industrial linkages across regions.  While 
once convergence between poor and rich regions was the norm, beginning in the 1990s wage 
growth has been distributed to regions already better off, a shift linked to increasing regional 
integration and globalization (Berry and Glaeser 2005).  Undergirding the growth in so-called 
“superstar cities” is a combination of venture capital, high tech jobs, human capital, and 
innovative capacity, which attracts knowledge workers and could further increase inequality. In 
short, the fastest growing places tend to be the most unequal.   
 Rather than linking regional productivity to regional inequality, this study links 
productivity indicators to an intraurban analogue of inequality – mixing – the extent to which 
non-like people live in close proximity.  The increasingly popular notion of urban inversion 
posits a “back to the city” movement especially in large, prosperous metros led by young adults 
and retirees moving toward city centers and into higher density housing, reversing a decades-
long trend of the suburbanization of the affluent (Ehrenhalt 2012).  This is accompanied by the 
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movement of tech jobs and headquarters to central cities in order to attract knowledge economy 
workers—both elements of global economic change which impact within-region spatial 
structure.   
Decades of sociological research on concentrated disadvantage emphasizes that 
segregation in neighborhoods can damper life opportunities by creating spatial and network 
separation between rich and poor (see, e.g. Sampson 2013; Wilson 1987).  As a region’s land use 
patterns are largely determined by the location decisions of the wealthy, segregation within a city 
is an important component of increasing inequality and decreasing exposure to different social 
and economic groups. Glaeser, Resseger, and Tobio (2009) suggest that the wealthy may develop 
empathy for the poor through spatial proximity – which could translate into support for social 
welfare programs.  Socioeconomic mixing, therefore, is thought to promote social and economic 
integration and increased opportunities for low-income residents.  As evidence, a longitudinal 
city-level analysis found that the combination of city level inequality and economic segregation 
within  the city’s neighborhoods  resulted in higher levels of crime (Hipp 2011), stressing the 
local dimension of inequality.  A study of cities from 1970 to 2010 found that higher levels of 
inequality were associated with larger increases in crime rates and that this relationship 
strengthened over time (Hipp and Kane 2017).   
While income inequality often dominates the discussion of social and economic 
transformation, wide-ranging scholarship has noted increasing divides in life chances, 
neighborhood choices, and spending habits that are class-based and occupation-based rather than 
purely income-based.  Researchers of urban gentrification, for example, have emphasized that 
segregation by education level or by occupation type may be more reflective of these changes in 
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cities (Freeman 2009).  Segregation by these measures indicates less integrated regions overall 
where life opportunities, social organization, and socio-political attitudes can be narrower. 
Florida (2017) discusses a number of these themes in The New Urban Crisis, building 
empirical research on metropolitan-level inequality and neighborhood segregation.  He 
emphasizes how by most interurban and intraurban measures, a distinctive set of large, dense, 
high-tech, and booming metros are also the most unequal and unaffordable.  In this paper, we 
extend his broad analysis of the connection between a metropolitan area’s level of inequality and 
the spatial segregation experienced by its residents in its neighborhoods with two important 
methodological and conceptual contributions. 
First, most prior research has measured segregation based on non-overlapping geographic 
units defined by statistical agencies – typically census tracts in the US – which do not account 
for the nearby environment.   Hipp and Boessen (2013) propose using “egohoods” – census units 
plus those within a certain buffer distance – to more accurately characterize the surroundings of 
an individual in urban space.  Clark, Anderson, Östh, and Malmberg (2015) use ego-centric 
measures and find the overlapping census unit approach to be an improved measure of 
neighborhood segregation and diversity. This paper considers “egohoods” of census block 
groups plus all other block groups within 1.5 miles.   
Second, explanations for inequality in a region are nonlinear and combinatorial in nature.  
While a connection can be drawn between inequality and factors like growth, education, 
occupational share, and crime, these characteristics are not independent of each other and affect 
regions differently.  Drawing linear associations in the form of correlations and ordinary least 
squares regression is largely unable to account for nonlinear moderating effects on parameter 
estimates; furthermore, interaction terms are cumbersome and difficult to interpret for all 
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covariates in OLS.  We use a promising alternative: the machine learning approach of Kernel 
Regularized Least Squares (KRLS) (Hainmueller and Hazlett 2014).  KRLS provides estimates 
of the marginal effect of each independent variable at each data point in the covariate space and 
provides closed-form estimates of the pointwise partial derivatives.  This allows for sharper 
estimation and importantly, the marginal effects can be regressed upon the model’s other 
variables, allowing for the determination of which “ingredients” combine to impact inequality.   
This study adds to the discussion of rising inequality across cities by connecting it to the 
level of mixing experienced by neighborhood residents with a new empirical approach which is 
more adept at considering regional inequality drivers including economic well-being, the 
business environment, housing characteristics, and demography.   
 
Data, Hypotheses, and Method 
This study’s statistical analysis considers the 381 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
in the United States in 2010.  Unless otherwise noted, data come from the US Census American 
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates for 2008-2012 (2014).  
Dependent Variables 
 First, we use pySAL software to construct block group egohood measures, in effect 
replacing each block group characteristic with the average (or total) value of all block groups 
within 1.5 miles (Rey 2013).  The actual size chosen for measuring the egohood is, of course, 
arbitrary to some degree.  Hipp and Boessen’s (2013) study of the localized process of 
neighborhood crime used egohoods measured at 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 miles, while Hipp, Kane, and 
Kim (2017) use 2.5 and 5 miles to measure jobs-housing balance—a broader process more 
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closely related to commuting. We argue the activity space of a neighborhood whereby a resident 
has some meaningful contact with others at schools, parks, stores, and local institutions lies 
somewhere in-between these thresholds.  While the median block group population in US metros 
is 1,268, the median block group egohood is comprised of five block groups and contains 10,093 
residents (see Appendix A). Consistent with Hipp and Boessen (2013) and given our use of 
categorically-derived variables, egohood populations are summed and are unweighted.  
We compute the degree of income mixing in each egohood based on the eleven discrete 
household income categories reported by the ACS.  Numerous indices exist for capturing the 
degree of mixing in a small area.  Florida (2017) uses group-specific dissimilarity indices 
measuring the separation between poor and non-poor, wealthy and non-wealthy, and an 
aggregated measure which combines the two.  Reardon and Bischoff’s (2011) rank-order 
information theory index captures the degree of mixing relative to the region overall.  For each 
region, we use the mean of the block group egohoods’ Gini coefficients because it is a single, 
ordered, continuous measure of mixing and considers mixing overall, not relative to the region.  
The regional mean therefore reflects the typical experience of a resident in a neighborhood of 
that metro—a high value indicating neighborhoods with a wide range of incomes.i    
While at the regional or national levels a higher Gini value denotes inequality, at the 
neighborhood scale it reflects income mixing, or the extent to which a neighborhood area 
contains households with a wide range of incomes.  This may be counterintuitive since typically 
a low value of Gini coefficient is considered “good.” However, we prefer the Gini coefficient for 
categorizing neighborhood income mixing over a categorical approach using entropy since 
income is inherently a continuous measure.   
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We take the mean value across all block group egohoods in an MSA to capture the 
typical neighborhood experience.  Since egohoods are overlapping analytical units, MSA-level 
variances were very small, suggesting that this form of spatial smoothing improves the 
robustness of the mean as a statistic to capture the MSA’s “typical neighborhood experience.”   
Our second outcome measure captures the level of education mixing in neighborhoods using the 
entropy across five educational categories from the ACS: no high school diploma, high school 
diploma, some college, bachelor’s degree, and graduate degree.  The entropy index is preferred 
as a categorical measure of the extent to which neighborhoods (or egohoods) are mixed across 
discrete educational categories.  The third outcome measure is the level of occupational mixing 
in neighborhoods which is an entropy measure based on Florida’s (2017) distinction between 
creative, service, and working class occupations (see Appendix B).   
Economic Well-Being 
 The first set of independent variables captures the level of regional economic well-being.  
Numerous studies have related the level of wages or income to the level of inequality (Florida 
and Mellander 2014; Glaeser, Resseger, and Tobio 2009).  We capture this using 1) average 
household income from the ACS and 2) MSA GDP per capita from the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  In addition we include growth in household income over the previous decade (2000-
2010).  Most prior research has generally associated income and growth with greater inequality 
region-wide, however our outcome measure of mixing at the neighborhood scale is conceptually 
the opposite of segregation measures.  Thus we hypothesize an inverse relationship between 
mixing and these measures of income, productivity, and growth.  Put differently, wealthy or 
growing regions will be less mixed.  We also examine the effect of metro-level unemployment 
and the share of population with a bachelor’s degree or above.  
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Business and Production 
 The second set of independent variables captures aspects of “superstar” or high-impact 
metros discussed in Florida (2017) which relate to the business environment and economic 
productivity.  We do not hypothesize on the specific pathways whereby each indicator 
contributes or does not contribute to mixing, focusing principally on the interaction of 
independent variables facilitated by KRLS. One common measure of national and global 
integration is the number of Fortune 1000 companies with headquarters locations in a region 
which is provided by ProximityOne (2017).  Another measure strongly implicated in rising 
inequality is the prevalence of start-up firms and venture capital investment, much of the activity 
of which is in the tech industry and historically is heavily concentrated in Silicon Valley and 
other highly innovative regions (Kenney 2000).  We use a logged measure of the total dollars of 
venture capital invested in that MSA from 2010-2015.  Following the perspective that invention 
and innovation are key components of the regional production function (Porter 2003), we include 
a logged count of patents issued to inventors in each MSA from the US Patent Office over 2010-
2015.  We also use the percent of a region’s employees working in creative industries (Florida 
2002).  The final business variable used is the percent of employees in an MSA who belong to a 
union which is compiled by the Census’ Current Population Survey.  This indicator varies mostly 
based on state policy and industrial composition.   
Housing 
 Given that the housing price bubble and the resulting foreclosure crisis could be 
considered causes and effects, respectively, of the Global Financial Crisis (Immergluck 2010, 
Martin 2011), and that housing unaffordability is a key characteristic of inequality as 
experienced in cities, we include several housing-related variables. Average home value is 
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included from the ACS, as well as the share of a region’s homes built in the last ten years.  This 
measure is intended to capture booming MSAs like Phoenix, Las Vegas, Orlando, or Charlotte 
which saw continual in-migration, have home construction as a major part of their regional 
economy, and generally were hurt by the housing crash of 2006-2008.  Contrastingly, we include 
the percentage of households who have been in the same home one year to capture in-migration 
and intraregional residential mobility, while the housing occupancy rate is used to provide a 
measure of housing market vibrancy.   
Demographic/Cultural/Political  
 We included five measures capturing the demographic composition of the region.  We 
capture the presence of retirement-age individuals (65 and above) as well as the youth share of 
the population (aged 0 to 19).  To understand a region’s racial/ethnic composition we include the 
percent Black, percent Latino, and a measure of racial/ethnic heterogeneity in the region based 
on a Herfindahl index of five groups (Asian, Black, Latino, White, and other race).  Glaeser et al. 
(2009) finds a robust relationship between murder rate and region-wide inequality, thus we 
include the violent crime rate (per 1,000 persons) in an MSA by summing the Uniform Crime 
Report data for police agencies in the region.  Following the contention from Florida (2017) that 
places with politically liberal attitudes tend to be more unequal, we include the percentage who 
voted for President Obama in 2012 (Rogers and Cage 2012).  We also take into account the 
possibility that religious attitudes may impact the level of mixing and include a measure of a 
region’s percent religious adherents from the American Religious Data Archive (ARDA).  
While city size is commonly associated with inequality (Baum-Snow and Pavan 2013), we omit 
this variable since the study includes numerous correlates to city size that may be more directly 
relevant to inequality on economic, policy, or cultural grounds.   
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Method – Kernel Regularized Least Squares 
A limitation of regression models is that the base assumption of linearity between 
independent variables and the outcome measure, as well as a lack of interactions between 
covariates in the model.  Although nonlinearization of independent variables is possible and 
interaction terms can be constructed, this can be cumbersome to parameterize.  For this reason, 
an alternative approach that shows considerable promise is the machine learning approach of 
Kernel Regularized Least Squares (KRLS) models described in Hainmueller and Hazlett (2014) 
and implemented for Stata in Ferwerda, Hainmueller, and Hazlett (2013).   
The KRLS approach provides estimates of the marginal effects of each independent 
variable at each data point in the covariate space (that is, the derivatives of this relationship) and 
provides closed-form estimates of the pointwise partial derivatives.  The function minimizes 
squared loss, and prefers smoother functions by reducing complexity in the optimal solution, 
which minimizes over-fitting.  The KRLS function nonparametrically estimates the relationship 
between all covariates and the outcome variable and their (nonparametric) interactions.   
 To detect nonlinearity and interactions, we regress the derivative estimates for each 
variable on each other variable one at a time and assessed the amount of variance explained.  The 
R-square of these regressions captures the degree to which the effect of a measure on the 
outcome differs based on values of the explanatory variable (i.e., interaction effects).  We used a 
cut-off R
2
 = 0.25 and plotted relationships of substantive interest.  Note that when derivatives are 
strongly related to other variables in the model (as captured by a high R
2
), this implies 
interaction effects.  We then plotted these interactions between the derivatives and a variable that 
exhibited a substantial relationship using Lowess regression to capture nonlinearities—which 
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groups observations with similar covariate values (Cleveland 1979)—and we plot the predicted 
values from these in the figures.     
 
Results and Discussion  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides top ten, bottom ten, and mean statistics across MSAs for our three 
outcome measures: neighborhood income mixing, educational mixing, and occupational mixing. 
Appendix C provides further comparison between these three measures at the MSA, block group, 
and egohood level  and suggests that mixing is more attenuated at the neighborhood than 
regional scale, but correlations between mixing measures are low enough to merit three separate 
analyses. Florida’s tract-level findings using a dissimilarity index concluded that the most 
segregated metros by income were Rustbelt metros like Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Detroit.  
New York was just outside the top ten, while other superstar cities and tech hubs generally had 
lower levels of income segregation.  In contrast, we measure the extent to which an MSA’s 
typical neighborhood is comprised of a variety of income levels (mixing).  The most mixed 
tended to be mid-sized, poorer areas in the South and Texas such as Greenville, NC, 
Brownsville, TX, McAllen, TX, and New Orleans, LA.  While income mixing is not 
significantly correlated with city size, it is inversely correlated with MSA median income (r=-
0.414) and strongly correlated with the share of households earning below $20,000/yr (r=0.770).  
This is somewhat expected since unlike Florida’s dissimilarity index, the mean of the Gini would 
be sensitive to the region’s income distribution.  Glaeser et al.’s (2009) study found that in 2000, 
Brownsville and McAllen ranked #2 and #3 in metro-level Gini (inequality).  However, the 
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experience of the typical resident of these cities is that they are spatially proximate to a wider 
array of households by income, illustrating the distinction between metropolitan and 
neighborhood measures.   
<< Table 1 about here >> 
In contrast, the places with the most segregated neighborhoods by income – where the 
typical experience would not likely be spatial proximity to households of a different income – 
consisted of two metros each from Alaska and Utah, Washington, DC, and Sheboygan, WI.  
These are typically higher income metros overall, but not universally. Sheboygan actually had 
the lowest overall income inequality in Glaser’s study (using 2006 data); however, its 
neighborhoods are amongst the least mixed by income while it ranks #113/381 in median 
income.   
We find the lowest levels of educational mixing to be in smaller metro areas in 
Appalachia, the South, and California’s central valley.  In contrast, the areas where the typical 
experience in a neighborhood is one of mixing amongst educational groups includes large metros 
such as New York, Miami, and San Jose (with San Francisco and Boston at #12 and #13) as well 
as a number of college towns – Columbia, MO, Athens, GA, New Haven, CT, and 
Charlottesville, VA.  As was the case with income mixing, neighborhood educational mixing is 
sensitive to the  MSA’s college education share (r = 0.730); for example Lake Havasu City-
Kingman, AZ has the second-lowest college education share (11.9%) and Dalton, GA has the 
fifth-lowest (12.6%).  The results for our five-category education mixing measure differ from 
Florida’s educational segregation index that only combined two dissimilarity indices: the 
segregation of high-school dropouts from everyone else, and the segregation of college graduates 
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from everyone else.  In contrast to our results, his top ten included Los Angeles, Houston, 
Chicago, and San Francisco.   
Finally, whereas Florida’s top ten by occupational segregation is almost exclusively 
comprised of high-end, tech-heavy large metros, our neighborhood-oriented measure of overall 
occupational mixing is very different.  The ten most mixed are almost all small-to-medium metro 
areas in the Midwest.  The ten metros where occupational categories are most segregated are 
comparable in size but with the exception of the lowest two – Atlantic City and Carbondale – are 
in the Sunbelt.  Occupational mixing is not highly correlated with city size, median income, or 
college education; rather it is most highly correlated with an MSA’s share of service workers (r = 
-0.743).  Occupational mixing, in this sense, is a function of both neighborhood occupational 
composition and whether a region’s economic base extends beyond services.  
Using neighborhood-level egohoods to mirror an individual’s experience within a city 
does not support the claim that large, dense, knowledge-based metros are more segregated.  
Myriad aspects of land use pattern and development history have led to the manner in which the 
well-off and the less well-off end up in proximate neighborhoods such as redlining, the timing of 
property booms and development, the recentness of migration and home construction, the 
distribution of natural amenities, the distribution of jobs, and whether the region’s central city 
declined or remained vibrant.  
Neighborhood Income Mixing Results 
Main Effects 
The main effects of metro-level factors on all three types of mixing are found in Table 2.  
Average coefficient estimates are shown as well as the estimate at the 25
th
, 50
th
, and 75
th
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percentile of the covariate’s distribution with the outcome measure capturing the average 
neighborhood’s level of mixing in each MSA irrespective of that MSA’s marginal distribution.  
A region’s average household income is inversely related to the average level of income mixing 
in its neighborhoods.  There is no effect for the fairly similar per-capita GDP measure, 
highlighting that these two measures are distinct conceptually.  However, metros with growing 
average income experience greater levels of neighborhood income mixing.  College education 
rates, but also higher unemployment rates in a region are each positively related to levels of 
neighborhood income mixing. 
<< Table 2 about here >> 
In terms of business-related variables, more Fortune 1000 companies and a higher rate of 
patenting are related to greater neighborhood income mixing, suggesting that these two 
indicators of economic productivity and global integration have a relation with neighborhood-
level factors.  However, the share of the population in a creative class occupation and the union 
membership rate each have a stronger, inverse relationship with neighborhood income mixing.  
Since these measures typically indicate a high share in one particular occupation type (creative or 
working-class), this result indicates that occupational polarization across a metro is associated 
with neighborhoods that are more homogenous by income.  
 While we might expect higher average home values in a metropolitan area to be related to 
more stratification across neighborhoods by income (by virtue of segregated, high-priced 
neighborhoods), there is no relationship between average home value and neighborhood income 
mixing.  However, the housing occupancy rate has an inverse relationship with neighborhood 
income mixing: higher average vacancy indicates higher neighborhood income mixing.  So too 
does the percentage of homes in the city that were built in the previous 10 years – a higher 
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proportion of new housing across the region is associated with lower neighborhood income 
mixing. 
 While the share of senior citizens in a region bears no relationship with neighborhood 
income mixing, metros with a higher share of children exhibit lower levels of neighborhood 
income mixing.  This could be due to families with children (more specifically, metros with high 
levels of families with children) seeking more stable or homogenous suburban neighborhoods, 
which could be reflected through lower neighborhood income mixing.  Additionally, greater 
levels of religious affiliation are associated with greater neighborhood income mixing. A higher 
share of Black or Latino population in a region is related to more neighborhood income mixing.  
However, a lower level of racial/ethnic mixing is associated with more mixed income 
neighborhoods, suggesting that while minority-heavy regions tend to have neighborhoods that 
are more mixed by income, metros with a blend of White, Black, Asian, and Latino residents 
actually are associated with more homogenous neighborhoods by income.  
KRLS/Lowess Effects  
 Up to now we have focused exclusively on the main effects of our model.  However, 
KRLS analysis allows for nonlinear interaction effects, while Lowess plots show how parameter 
estimates vary across the covariate space.  Figures 1-3 show derivative estimates against the 
variables themselves where R
2
 > 0.25.    Table 3 summarizes main effects and uses arrows as 
well as union and intersect notation to approximate the shape of the Lowess plot, indicating the 
nonlinear effects of the “moderating” variable on a parameter estimate.  
<< Table 3 about here >>  
<< Figure 1 about here >> 
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<< Figure 2 about here >> 
<< Figure 3 about here >> 
 Although per-capita GDP exhibited no significant main effect, a context with a higher 
share of Black population and a moderate-level of racial/ethnic mixing results in a positive effect 
of per-capita GDP on income mixing (Figures 1A and 1B, respectively).  While metro-level 
average incomes had a negative relationship with neighborhood income mixing, this was 
strongest with a moderate-level of senior citizens (Figure 1C).  Put differently, metro-level 
incomes did not have as significant a negative effect on neighborhood income mixing in the 
presence of very many or very few senior citizens in a region.  While regions with growing 
average income exhibited more neighborhood income mixing, this is tempered when a high 
proportion of the region’s workers are creative class (1E).  This important finding which 
suggests that while metro growth may have a positive effect on neighborhood income mixing, it 
is tempered when employment is too highly concentrated in creative class occupations.  
Furthermore, while overall there is an inverse relationship between creative class share and 
neighborhood income mixing, higher GDP/capita tends to strengthen the effect of creative class 
polarization (1F).    
 A number of highly fitting Lowess curves are found for the impact of new housing on 
neighborhood income mixing – which has a negative main effect Figures 1G through 1J.  Four 
other regional variables individually strengthen this negative effect: lower average household 
incomes, lower patent counts, a lower share of creative class employment, and a lower share of 
Obama voters.  These results suggest a relationship between rapid housing construction in a 
region and neighborhood homogeneity by income, which is strengthened in lower-income, less 
creative, less inventive, and Republican-leaning metros.   
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Additionally, moderate average household income augments the positive effect of Black 
population on neighborhood income mixing - a relationship that breaks down in very wealthy or 
poor regions (1O).  While on its own the violent crime rate has no effect on a region’s level of 
neighborhood income mixing, combined with low levels of new housing, there is a positive 
effect (1Q).  In addition, more new housing mitigates the positive relationship between 
unemployment and neighborhood income mixing (1D).  A related phenomenon might be the 
impact of housing tenure.  While there is essentially no main effect, a lower college education 
rate and a lower share of creative class workers each combine with long housing tenure to 
decrease neighborhood income mixing (1K-1L).  Put differently, regions with a lot of people 
who stay put in their homes are associated with lower neighborhood income mixing, but only in 
regions with low levels of college education or creative class work.  Finally, while the percent 
who voted for Obama in 2012 has no effect on its own, in highly unionized regions Obama 
support is strongly related to neighborhood income mixing, but in non-unionized regions Obama 
support is strongly negatively related to neighborhood income mixing (1P).     
Neighborhood Educational Mixing Results 
Main Effects   
 Overall, a region’s per-capita GDP as well as growth in average household income each 
have an inverse relationship with neighborhood-level educational mixing; the relationship with 
growth is stronger.  A region’s unionization rate is strongly negatively associated with 
neighborhood mixing by education. However, regions with higher home values, with a high 
share of long-tenured residents, and with a low proportion of child population (i.e. fewer families 
with children) also have higher levels of neighborhood educational mixing.  While more Latino 
population and higher racial/ethnic mixing is associated with educational mixing in 
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neighborhoods, a region’s Black population is inversely related.  The percentage who voted for 
President Obama in 2012 and religious affiliation also have positive relationships with 
educational mixing.   
KRLS/Lowess 
 Several factors mitigate these relationships.  While regional college education share is 
associated with greater educational mixing this relationship is greatest at a moderate-level of 
household income, GDP/capita, and Obama voters (2A-2C).  At the extremes of these three 
distributions, the relationship between college education rates and neighborhood educational 
mixing weakens.   
 While regional creative class share has a positive, but insignificant main effect on 
educational mixing in neighborhoods, it has a positive or negative relationship depending on the 
distribution of three other variables.  In regions with a low share of senior citizens or few long-
tenured householders, creative class share has a negative relationship with neighborhood 
educational mixing (2E-2F).  Additionally, higher college education rates also result in a 
negative impact for creative class share on educational mixing: high education and creative class 
result in lower mixing (2G).  This appears consistent with the notion of highly educated creative 
class, often tech-oriented employees who tend to be younger and are more likely to move, either 
within or across regions.  Given these mitigating factors – but not alone – a creative class 
economy may result in neighborhoods which are less mixed by education level. The marginal 
effect of patenting is similarly affected by college education share: only in highly educated 
regions is does a high amount of patent activity associate with lower educational mixing (patents 
and creative class share are positively correlated, r=0.508).  Finally, while the presence of more 
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Latinos has a positive relationship with neighborhood educational mixing, this is lessened by 
high racial/ethnic mixing in the region.   
Neighborhood Occupational Mixing Results 
Main Effects 
Results show that occupational mixing in neighborhoods is positively associated with 
both GDP/capita and average household income but inversely related to growth in household 
income, suggesting that more prosperous regions – but not growing regions – exhibit local 
mixing by occupation type. In addition, unemployment and college education rates in a region 
have an inverse effect on neighborhood occupational mixing.  A higher share of creative class 
workers is associated with more mixing, but the number of Fortune 1000 headquarters has an 
inverse relationship with neighborhood occupational mixing.   
 Housing occupancy rates, long-tenured householders, and the share of new homes each 
have a positive relationship with neighborhood occupational mixing, though no relationship was 
seen for average home value in a region.  While the share of senior citizens was immaterial, the 
proportion of children had a positive relationship with occupational mixing in neighborhoods.  
While we did not expect either age category to have much of an effect given that these are non-
working age individuals, a higher share of families in a region (population age 0-19) appears 
associated with mixing.  Lower shares of Black and Latino population – and lower racial/ethnic 
mixing in a region – are each associated with more occupational mixing.  Religious affiliation 
has a positive relationship with occupational mixing while the violent crime rate has an inverse 
relationship with occupational mixing.  
KRLS/Lowess 
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We detect several mitigating effects for the relationships between these measures and 
occupational mixing.  While new housing’s impact on income and educational mixing was 
strongly related to other factors, it has a more straightforward relationship with occupational 
mixing: generally positive, but declining in regions with a high share of Latinos (Figure 3E).  
The positive effects of GDP and household income for occupational mixing are heavily 
influenced by other conditions.  Only at moderate-levels of household income did GDP have a 
positive relationship – it was close to zero in very high or very low income metros (3A).  The 
same could be said for the joint effect of household income and patenting: at very high or low 
levels of patenting, household income did not have a strong positive relationship with 
neighborhood occupational mixing (3B). Also at very high levels of venture capital investment, 
higher average incomes are actually associated with lower neighborhood occupational mixing 
(3C).   
The level of racial/ethnic mixing in a region has several mitigating effects.  While highly 
religious metros are associated with more occupational mixing, this effect is tempered and 
actually negative in cases of high racial/ethnic mixing (3I).  While higher home values have no 
main effect on occupational mixing, their relationship with occupational mixing is positive in 
racially homogeneous metros, but negative in racially mixed metros (3D).  Finally while a 
region’s Latino share is inversely related to neighborhood occupational mixing, this effect is 
augmented further in racially/ethnically mixed metros (3G).  Lastly while support for Obama in 
2012 was not related to neighborhood occupational mixing on average, this effect depends on 
religious affiliation: in religious areas, Obama support is associated with more mixing, while in 
less religious areas, Obama support is associated with less neighborhood occupational mixing.   
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Conclusions  
 This study contributes to the increasingly apparent issue of income inequality in US 
metropolitan areas by linking often-cited inequality drivers with a related, but different outcome 
measure: neighborhood mixing.  We make two methodological contributions: first, to take an 
egocentric approach of overlapping census block groups to more accurately capture an 
individual’s surroundings in urban space, and second, to use combinatorial estimation which 
allows for the identification of “ingredients” which combine to impact spatial inequality. 
Specifically, we link differences (or, mixing) in income, educational attainment, and occupation 
type – the lived experience of being near others in a neighborhood – to regional drivers related to 
economic well-being, business and production, housing, and demographic characteristics.   
While Florida (2017) suggests that large, dense, knowledge-based metro regions are more 
segregated, we find different patterns at the neighborhood scale.  Poorer, higher poverty metros, 
many in the South and in Texas, tend to have neighborhoods that are actually more mixed by 
income while “superstar” regions have neither the most mixed or most segregated 
neighborhoods.  Larger regions and college towns do tend to have higher levels of educational 
mixing in their neighborhoods, and regions with a higher share of service workers have more 
homogenous neighborhoods (see Appendix D for a brief comparison of some key metros).  
Despite these differences from Florida’s findings, KRLS allows for the emergence of a 
major point regarding the relationship between occupation type and creative class.  When a 
metro’s occupational blend is more polarized, its neighborhoods tend to be more homogenous by 
income.  Residents sort by myriad factors but broad distinctions between creative, service, and 
working-class occupations appear to show strong effects.  In addition, while income growth is a 
strong predictor of income mixing, it is tempered when employment is too highly concentrated in 
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creative class occupations – consistent with the concern of inequality in “superstar” cities.  
Certain other factors appear to also combine with a metro’s creative class share to make 
neighborhoods more homogenous by education level: fewer seniors, shorter housing tenure, and 
higher college educated share.  This is somewhat consistent with the notion of highly educated, 
younger, mobile, tech-oriented creative class worker; results hint at the possibility that this 
phenomenon may lead to greater sorting into neighborhoods by education level.  So, while 
superstar cities may not be as consistently unequal, similar combinations of factors may lead to 
neighborhood segregation.  
A region’s share of new housing – built within the previous ten years – also shows a 
number of mitigating effects on neighborhood mixing.  Given this study’s timeframe this 
corresponds to housing built during the 2000s; much of it in the lead-up to the global financial 
crisis.  More new housing in a region meant lower income mixing overall, a result which is 
consistent with homogenous city areas with a similarly aged and priced housing stock. However 
this negative relationship was strongly augmented by regions with lower incomes, less inventive 
activity, less creative class, and less support for Obama.  While this is speculative, these factors 
appear to suggest a component of neighborhood segregation in fast-growing cities that were hit 
hard by the financial crisis.  There appears to be a paradoxically similar relationship between 
long-tenured householdership and income-based segregation; however, this relationship existed 
only in regions with low education levels and less creative class work.   
An additional point can be made regarding racial and ethnic composition: more black or 
Latino residents in a region generally led to more neighborhood mixing by income, but less 
neighborhood mixing by occupation.  Metros with a more even racial/ethnic mix, on the other 
hand, are associated with income segregation.  A region’s history of redlining or race-based 
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spatial separation is one key element of historical development trajectory omitted from empirical 
treatment in this paper.  While new housing share does capture one dimension of local land use 
pattern, myriad idiosyncratic factors have led to the way in which the privileged and less 
privileged have sorted across urban neighborhoods, including development timing, home 
construction trends, central city vibrancy, and the prevalence of stable, wealthy enclaves. This 
paper’s cross-sectional analysis using 2008-2012 data also coincides with a time of urban 
transition—demographically as millennials age into homeownership, the economy moves 
beyond the Global Financial Crisis, and many urban downtowns are revitalized.  Future research 
on urban neighborhood dynamics would benefit from a longitudinal approach beyond the scope 
of this paper.   
The combinatorial effects of region-level covariates on mixing measures are particularly 
tricky to analyze case-by-case or through more intuitive, bivariate relationships—a strength of 
KRLS despite the reality that some of the uncovered relationships may be undertheorized or defy 
clear explanation.  These findings demonstrate that while implicating “superstar” cities in the 
crisis of inequality is insufficient, there are strong connections between this large-scale problem 
and the level of exposure in neighborhoods that individuals have to others who are not like them.  
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i
 We generated rank order information theory indices (H) for income and education and re-ranour 
model.  The correlation between H and our measure was r = 0.091 for income mixing and r = -
0.071 for educational mixing, indicating these measures are conceptually distinct—likely due to 
the fact that H is region-relative whereas our measure is one of central tendency. Furthermore, 
interpretation of H becomes more complex while using block group egohoods, which already 
condition values based on neighbors and would merit additional research.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
TABLE 1: TOP AND BOTTOM 10 METRO AREAS BY NEIGHBORHOOD MIXING
Rank Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) Gini Coefficient Rank Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) Entropy Rank Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) Entropy
1 Greenville, NC 0.461 1 Columbia, MO 0.929 1 Wausau, WI 0.942
2 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 0.455 2 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 0.925 2 Sheboygan, WI 0.935
3 Morgantown, WV 0.451 3 Napa, CA 0.924 3 Columbus, IN 0.927
4 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 0.450 4 Santa Fe, NM 0.922 4 Appleton, WI 0.927
5 Athens-Clarke County, GA 0.448 5 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL 0.921 5 Fargo, ND-MN 0.924
6 College Station-Bryan, TX 0.446 6 Athens-Clarke County, GA 0.921 6 Racine, WI 0.924
7 Corvallis, OR 0.445 7 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 0.920 7 Bismarck, ND 0.923
8 Bloomington, IN 0.440 8 New Haven-Milford, CT 0.920 8 Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA 0.922
9 New Orleans-Metairie, LA 0.438 9 Charlottesville, VA 0.919 9 Cedar Rapids, IA 0.921
10 El Centro, CA 0.438 10 Missoula, MT 0.918 10 Fond du Lac, WI 0.921
Mean Value across all MSAs 0.399 Mean Value across all MSAs 0.871 Mean Value across all MSAs 0.869
372 Cheyenne, WY 0.3643 372 Hinesville, GA 0.814 372 Lake Havasu City-Kingman, AZ 0.801
373 Anchorage, AK 0.3639 373 Lake Havasu City-Kingman, AZ 0.814 373 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 0.798
374 Sheboygan, WI 0.3631 374 Mansfield, OH 0.812 374 Brunswick, GA 0.798
375 Norwich-New London, CT 0.3618 375 Jacksonville, NC 0.812 375 Laredo, TX 0.797
376 Provo-Orem, UT 0.3588 376 Visalia-Porterville, CA 0.810 376 Jacksonville, NC 0.791
377 Columbus, IN 0.3580 377 Lima, OH 0.809 377 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 0.791
378 Fairbanks, AK 0.3564 378 Dalton, GA 0.808 378 Sierra Vista-Douglas, AZ 0.789
379 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 0.3550 379 Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH 0.807 379 Sebring, FL 0.787
380 California-Lexington Park, MD 0.3506 380 Altoona, PA 0.800 380 Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ 0.785
381 Ogden-Clearfield, UT 0.3484 381 Madera, CA 0.798 381 Carbondale-Marion, IL 0.784
*Measured by Gini Coefficient; high values are most mixed within a neighborhood
INCOME MIXING BY NEIGHBORHOOD* (2010) EDUCATION LEVEL MIXING BY NEIGHBORHOOD* (2010) OCCUPATION TYPE MIXING BY NEIGHBORHOOD* (2010)
*Measured by Entropy; high values are most mixed *Measured by Entropy; high values are most mixed
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Economic Well-Being
Avg (t-
value) P25 P50 P75
Avg (t-
value) P25 P50 P75
Avg (t-
value) P25 P50 P75
GDP per capita 0.009  -0.090 -0.006 0.079 -0.111 † -0.223 -0.110 0.005 0.276 ** 0.164 0.279 0.391
(0.24) -(1.89) (4.17)
Average household income -0.001 ** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 0.001
-(23.53) (0.31) (7.50)
Percent with a bachelor's degree 1.103 ** 0.800 1.117 1.438 1.989 ** 1.395 2.121 2.658 -0.766 ** -1.016 -0.790 -0.575
(16.57) (20.51) -(7.59)
Unemployment rate 1.500 ** 0.899 1.557 2.139 0.023  -0.586 -0.027 0.530 -0.672 * -1.106 -0.648 -0.207
(8.83) (0.09) -(2.27)
Change in average household income, 2000-10 39.961 ** 17.001 40.572 61.617 -12.845 † -26.727 -14.011 0.654 -39.201 ** -56.384 -40.569 -23.216
(8.46) -(1.73) -(4.60)
Business and Production
Venture capital rate (logged) -0.045  -0.153 -0.038 0.063 -0.076  -0.205 -0.055 0.068 0.069  -0.082 0.081 0.202
-(1.32) -(1.35) (0.98)
Fortune 1000 headquarters 0.108 † 0.001 0.084 0.203 -0.128  -0.208 -0.123 -0.047 -0.141 † -0.202 -0.136 -0.083
(1.85) -(1.57) -(1.74)
Number of patents (logged) 2010-15 0.587 * -0.131 0.581 1.249 0.321  -0.609 0.442 1.324 -0.122  -0.665 -0.109 0.489
(2.37) (0.83) -(0.28)
Percent employees in creative industries -0.261 ** -0.534 -0.255 0.001 0.120  -0.126 0.143 0.396 0.533 ** 0.300 0.532 0.765
-(3.69) (1.09) (4.33)
Percent union employees -10.841 * -27.092 -11.334 5.206 -44.263 ** -68.712 -43.751 -16.450 -8.491  -25.765 -5.771 15.016
-(2.34) -(5.92) -(0.95)
Housing
Average housing sales price 0.006  -0.054 0.005 0.066 0.054 * -0.022 0.050 0.131 0.014  -0.050 0.020 0.091
(0.40) (2.27) (0.50)
Percent new housing units in last 10 years -0.063 † -0.226 -0.044 0.119 -0.028  -0.161 -0.017 0.099 0.196 ** 0.043 0.195 0.359
-(1.82) -(0.50) (3.07)
Percent occupied units -0.305 ** -0.578 -0.296 -0.034 -0.035  -0.317 -0.067 0.263 1.134 ** 0.906 1.167 1.457
-(4.09) -(0.31) (8.90)
Percent in same house 5 years ago 0.123  -0.191 0.146 0.485 0.255 † -0.349 0.196 0.776 1.322 ** 0.792 1.311 1.781
(1.25) (1.67) (7.52)
Table 2. KRLS models of average income mixing, education mixing, and occupation mixing in 381 SMSAs
Average income mixing Average education mixing Average occupation mixing
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Demographic, Cultural, and Political
Percent aged 65 and up 0.165  -0.121 0.121 0.487 -0.100  -0.514 -0.094 0.303 0.092  -0.050 0.136 0.316
(1.22) -(0.52) (0.47)
Percent aged 0 to 19 -1.526 ** -2.103 -1.579 -1.051 -1.239 ** -1.624 -1.245 -0.865 1.548 ** 0.878 1.586 2.217
-(9.19) -(5.13) (6.09)
Percent black 0.270 ** 0.110 0.267 0.434 -0.148 ** -0.312 -0.140 0.018 -0.500 ** -0.682 -0.529 -0.321
(7.01) -(2.66) -(8.44)
Percent Latino 0.180 ** 0.099 0.170 0.244 0.200 ** 0.057 0.209 0.367 -0.108 ** -0.223 -0.096 0.022
(6.66) (5.30) -(2.74)
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity -0.067 * -0.141 -0.062 0.004 0.128 ** 0.017 0.132 0.237 -0.158 ** -0.265 -0.158 -0.058
-(2.45) (3.15) -(3.52)
Percent voted for Obama in 2008 -0.028  -0.126 -0.029 0.060 0.116 * 0.016 0.122 0.231 -0.067  -0.172 -0.082 0.024
-(0.85) (2.30) -(1.17)
Percent religious adherents 0.101 ** -0.031 0.106 0.232 0.138 ** -0.020 0.115 0.282 0.135 * -0.013 0.134 0.258
(3.70) (3.15) (2.55)
Violent crime rate 0.003  -0.005 0.004 0.012 0.002  -0.005 0.001 0.010 -0.017 ** -0.025 -0.018 -0.011
(1.58) (0.67) -(4.53)
N 381 381 381
R-square 0.940 0.894 0.842
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF NONLINEAR EFFECTS IN KRLS REGRESSION
Category Variable
Main 
Effect* 
(Income)
Which metro-area factors 
impact neighborhood 
income mixing?**
Main Effect* 
(Education)
Which metro-area factors 
impact neighborhood 
education mixing?**
Main Effect* 
(Occupation)
Which metro-area factors 
impact neighborhood 
occupation mixing?**
GDP/capita 0 ↑% Black - + ∩ Avg. HH Income
∩ Racial/Ethnic Mixing
Average HH Income - U % > Age 65 0 + ∩ Patent count
↓ Venture Capital
% with B.A. + + ∩ Avg. HH Income -
∩ GDP/capita
∩ % Obama voters
Unemployment + ↓ % New Homes 0 -
Growth in Avg. HH Inc. + ↓% Creative Class - -
Venture Capital 0 0 0
Fortune 500 HQs + 0 -
Patent Count + 0 ↓% w/B.A. 0
% Creative Class - ↓ GDP/capita 0 ↑ % > Age 65 +
↑ % Long Tenure
↓% w/B.A.
Unionization Rate - - ↑ Racial/Ethnic mixing 0
Economic Well-
Being
Business and 
Production
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Housing Average Home Value 0 + 0 ↓ Racial/Ethnic Mix
% New Homes (<10yrs) - ↓ Avg. HH Income 0 + ↓ % Latino
↓ Patent Count
↓ Creative Class
↓ % Obama Voters
Occupancy Rate - +
% Long tenure (>10yrs) 0 ↓ % w/B.A. + ↑ % w/B.A. +
↓ % Creative Class ↑ Creative Class
% > Age 65 0 ↑ % Obama Voters 0 ↑ Avg. HH Inc. 0
↑ Creative Class ↑ % Latino
% < Age 19 - - + ∩ % > Age 65
% Black + ∩ Avg. HH Income - -
% Latino + + ↓ Racial/Ethnic Mixing - ↓ Racial/Ethnic Mixing
Racial/Ethnic Mixing - + -
% Obama voters (2008) 0 ↑ Unionization + 0 ↑ % Religious Affiliated
% Religious Affiliated + + + ↓ Racial/Ethnic Mixing
Violent Crime Rate 0 ↑w/o New Housing 0 -
* Summarizes the direction of the main effect from Table 2: positive and significant (p<0.10 or better), negative and significant (p<0.10 or better), or not significant (0)
**Mitigating factor which affects main effect. Arrow, U or ∩ indicates direction of effect which can be seen in Figures 2-4.
Demographic, 
Cultural, and 
Political
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